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Black, grey or white? Finding the new 
shade of corruption in Ukraine.
Anna Markovska and Alexey Serduyk1
Introduction: why Mykola never saw his tank
Ukraine was a part of Soviet Union for about 70 years. Inevitably, after 
the collapse of the USSR, Ukraine inherited many Soviet institutions. The 
Soviet-like military education provides us with an interesting example of 
the social institution that has a particular concern and attitudes of ordinary 
people. The situation was such that “those who graduated from the military 
institutes had to serve in the Soviet army; those who graduated from the civilian 
institutions had to attend military training at the military faculties” to get “the 
status of ‘reservist’ and the officer’s rank”(Gerasymchuk, 2008, p. 4). In the 
last decade there was a change: many young Ukrainian men entering high 
education had an interesting new choice. They could either join the Military 
Faculties within the institution of their choice and become a reservist; or 
they could wait to the end of their degree to join the army for one year to 
fulfil compulsory military service. In regard of the latter option and knowing 
the precarious existence of military personnel in Ukraine, as well as the 
abuse of the leadership and issues with harsh discipline, for many the choice 
was clear. At this point the other legacy of the Soviet Union comes to the 
rescue: corruption. They could either bribe their way in or pay ‘entrance fees’ 
to join a Military Faculty which has a better social climate. Once they were 
in, duties were not onerous as long as official or unofficial payments were 
maintained, and thus the young men could end up with a reservist status at 
the end of their degree. Not obtaining a genuine military training was not 
necessarily an issue for our hypothetical Mykola, whose close family often 
covered the costs of bribes. Mr Mykola avoided formail training by paying 
the required bribes, and was happy to receive reservist status, presuming that 
1 The authors are, respectively, Senior Lecturer in Criminology, Anglia Ruskin 
University, UK (anna.markovska@anglia.ac.uk) and Head of Scientific Research 
Department on Distance Education, Kharkiv National University of Internal Affairs, 
Ukraine.
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no one was actually planning to start an armed conflict. In summer of 2014, 
Mr Mykola realised that this was a wrong speculation; although he is a junior 
lieutenant in the tank division, he has never seen a tank, and doesn’t want to 
see any, but given the ongoing military conflict in the East it is only a matter 
of time until he will receive the feared letter that will summon him to fulfill 
his duty and defend his country. He may not want to fight, perhaps doesn’t 
fully understand the ongoing situation, nor whom is he going to protect. 
What does he do? Together with his parents he considers how to avoid 
conscription. Fortunately there are different ways, and different amounts of 
bribes, that might help Mr Mykola keep out of the tank he has never seen. 
 The story of Mr Mykola illustrates the story of a pervasive corruption 
that destroys the system as well as individuals. It is about pretending to 
do something whilst paying for it. On paper, Mr Mykola and many of 
his friends, are building the military capability of the country. In reality, 
they were building the military equivalent of a Potemkin village. Only the 
difference is that Potemkin villages did exist and were shown to Catherine 
the Great when inspected. Unfortunately, when Ukrainian military service 
was called to defend the country, it was apparent that a large part existed only 
on paper while those in authority had stolen everything from tanks to pants. 
Corruption had completely sapped the state defences.
 In the last 20 years a lot has been said about Ukraine as ‘transitional 
society’ and about corruption in the country (Osyka, 2003; Markovska and 
Isaeva, 2007; Markovska and Serduyk, 2011). Ukraine, the second biggest 
country in Europe, suffered decades of poor governance, and lack of political 
and economic reforms (Kupatadze, 2012; Markovska and Serduyk, 2013). 
Kupatadze (2012) discussed Ukraine as the best country to test theories “about 
the underworld-upperworld networks” (p.91). Markovska and Serduyk (2011) 
argued that the criminal underworld developed and infiltrated the political 
upper-world in the country over the last 15 years. The Orange revolution 
of the 2004 promised to fight corruption and improve transparency of the 
government. However, events of the autumn of 2013 and winter 2014 in 
Ukraine showed that these promises were not fulfilled: the transition of 
Ukraine had been one towards a criminal state. Subsequently, a lot more was 
promised in the summer of 2014. On a visit to Singapore in December 2014 
President Poroshenko said that the two most important wars Ukraine has to 
win are the war in the East of the country and the war against corruption. In 
Singapore Mr Poroshenko visited the Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau 
and suggested that Singapore’s anti-corruption policies can be a benchmark 
for Ukraine (Channel NewsAsia, 2014). It is interesting to note that when 
Mr. Poroshenko was appointed to a high governmental position after the 
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Orange revolution, it “generated speculations on replacing ‘Kuchma-era oligarchs’ 
with ‘new ones’” (Copsey, 2005, as cited in Kupatadze, 2012, p.108).
 This chapter aims to discuss two important and inter-related issues. 
The first is the development of Ukraine as a criminal state, and further 
the analysis of the statement that in the last 20 year organised criminal 
groups in Ukraine have integrated into the political sphere of the country 
and captured its administrative functions. The second and related theme is 
corruption. Corruption is considered as an important tool in the process of 
criminalisation of the state, the tool employed at many different levels in the 
hierarchy of the state apparatus. This chapter explores the functionality of 
corruption within the dysfunctional system of the public administration.
 Generally, it is agreed that corruption is an obstacle to the development 
of the country. Anti-corruption slogans moved thousands of people 
to protest in the winter of 2014, and the movement saw the fall of the 
President Yanukovich, the “absolute autocrat who was accountable to nobody” 
(borrowed from Van Duyne’s (2001) description of tsar Nicholas I). Against 
the background of this popular revolt, what is interesting to study is the 
attitude of the ‘common man’ to corruption and how far the ordinary people 
are prepared to act to stop corruption. The chapter presents results of two 
monitorings of corruption in the city of Kharkiv: the first one conducted 
in December 2013 and the second in October 2014. The monitorings were 
conducted by the second author under the auspices of the University of 
Internal Affairs, Kharkiv. 
Criminal elite and political power
Before moving on to discuss the most recent past, it is worth noting the 
position of organised criminal groups during the Soviet times. Althouth 
presented to the outside world, as the system that promoted the equality and 
thus low level of criminality, Soviet Union was far away from this imaginary 
ideal. Many researchers commented on the fact that during Soviet times, 
organised criminals stayed outside of political circles (Cheloukhine, 2008). 
During Soviet times, an extreme shortage in food and consumer goods 
facilitated the development of the shadow economy and thus organised 
criminal groups took advantage of this scarcety to provide coveted goods 
and services prohibited by law (Ibid., p.363). According to Yarmysh (2001, p. 
145), traditionally ‘a thieves’ code of honour’ prohibited engagement with 
outside institutions or affiliations, and law enforcement agents. However, 
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from the late 1970s, this code has been transformed. During Brezhnev’s rule 
major criminal bridgeheads were developed within the highest echelons of 
ministerial power (Cheloukhine, 2008). With the implosion of the socialist 
state ten years later, post-Soviet capitalism further challenged the previously 
hold perception not to cooperate with politicians. The money-making 
opportunities were great and fast. Cheloukhine argued that the contemporary 
criminal syndicates emerged during the collapse of the USSR. During the 
last decade of the 20th Century many criminal groups accumulated illegal 
wealth by engaging as criminal entrepreneurs with politicians. The chaos 
of those years was such that it is difficult to separate legal from illegal or 
corrupt from honest. It can be argued that democracy ‘the Ukrainian way’, 
worked for the selected few, and actually increased corruption. In the first 
decade of the 21st Century a number of rich individuals with a criminal past 
invested in politics, raising their profiles by corrupt means. How was that 
possible? Rushenko (2014) answered this question by arguing that criminal 
leaders offered something that was missing in ordinary politicians: charisma, 
bravery and charitable activities. It can be compared it to the behaviour of 
some drug barons in Columbia, who invest in social infrastructure in order 
to allegedly help ordinary people. These ordinary people seem to accept the 
token of support from their masters without questions asked: obidience to 
authority is a key issue here. Those who disobey, question and investigate can 
be considered as enemy.
 Glenny (2008) narrates a gangland killing of a young Ukrainian journalist2 
and the Melnychenko tapes that accelerated the demise of the regime of 
President Kuchma (p. 103). He argues that “this was not a conventional gangland 
killing: higher powers were involved. In this instance, the mafia organisation was 
the Ukrainian state itself” (p. 99). The MP who headed the Investigative 
Committee into Organise Crime and Corruption, Hryhory Omelchenko, 
has stated in Ukraine’s parlament that “the country’s chief capo was none other 
than the President himself, Leonid Danilovych Kuchma” (p. 99). In order to secure 
absolute power Kuchma controlled and exploited the political system and 
the state institutions (Ibid.). Glenny wrote how “away from Kiev, where the 
spotlight of domestic and international scrutiny shines brightly, powerful criminal 
interests continue to dominate” (Ibid. p.103).
2 In September 2000, after writing about corruption among Ukrainian elite, Georgy 
Gongadze was kidnapped and killed. His decapitated body was found several months 
later (see The Guardian, 2009). The Melnychenko tapes implicated the president in 
the killing of the journalist.
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 Analysing the example of two organised criminal groups, Markovska 
and Serduyk (2011) noted how the criminal underworld that has always 
existed in the country came to dominate the political upper-world in the 
first few years of new millennium. This process was completed in September 
2010 with the appointment of a member of an organised criminal group to 
a senior ministerial position within the Ministry of Defence. Against this 
background it is not surprising that in 2015 Ukrainian military personal 
had to wear second hand clothes collected by the ordinary members of the 
public. Not surprising, but so humiliating. It looked like the capture of the 
state organs by criminals or their associates has been completed. 
 Kupatadze (2012) analysed the development of a corrupt economy in 
the Donetsk region. He argues that “the industrial city of Donetsk provides 
an interesting account of the establishment of political-economic groups and clan 
dominated of heavy industry. The industrial development of the region generates more 
opportunities for large scale corruption than the more rural and agricultural Western 
regions” (p.101). Although much destroyed in 2014-2015 military conflict, but 
in the mid-2000s the regional economy produced roughly 62 per cent of the 
country’s industrial output (Ibid.). Williams and Picarelly (2004) argued that 
organised crime in Donbas was one of the most developed in the country, 
abusing the state resoucres on a massive scale (as discussed in Kupatadze, 
2012, p.102). The Donetsk clan managed to take control of most of the 
regional economy, “shielding it from international business competition by 
making deals to restrict market access” (Ibid., p.103). The clan has managed 
to use a strong sense of regional identity in order to achieve its goal of 
economic success.
So, is this a question of domination or capturing the state? The concept of 
‘state capture’ is addressed variously in the literature. Hellman, Jones and 
Kaufman (2000) discussed the differences between state capture, influence 
and administrative corruption. State capture is defined as “shaping the 
formation of the basic rules of the game (i.e. laws, rules, decrees and regulations) 
through illicit and non-transparen private payments to public officials” (Ibid., 
p.2). Influence is about the ability of the private interests to interfear 
“without necessary resources to private payments to public officials” (Ibid.), and 
administrative corruption is defined as “private paymnets to public officials to 
distort the prescribed implementation of official rules and policies” (ibid.). Hellman 
and Kaufmann (2001) defined state capture more specifically by referring 
to oligarchs who manipulate policy formation and “even shaping the emerging 
rules of the game to their own, very substantial advantage”. The above definions 
require the captors (legally or illegally present at the scene) and the 
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government (state officials). Hellman et al. (2000) “understand state capture 
as the extent to which firms make illicit and non-transparent private payments 
to public officials in order to influence the formation of laws, rules, regulations or 
decrees by state institutions” (p.5). The way the capture metaphor works here 
is that these groups capture the state functions when needed and leave it. 
Wedel (2005) criticised this concept by pointing to two isues. Firstly, is 
the idea of “capture”, and the need to address the issue of “uncaptured” 
state. Secondly, Wedel argues that for example, in Russia “many of the people 
who ammased wealth during the years of ‘reform’ did so because of the state, 
not by capturing it” (p.114). These people simply used their networks and 
opportunities to access goods and priveleges (Ibid.). 
 In this chapter we will discuss the mechanisms used by organising political 
criminals in capturing the administrative functions of the state. We extent 
the capture metaphor even further and argue that in Ukraine the organised 
criminal groups bought their state and political party positions from officials 
representing the state. Starting from the early 2000, and perphas earlier, 
criminals came to dominate political world by means of offering payments to 
the existent system. Finally, by 2010, most of the state positions were bought 
by members of different criminal groups. Below, we discuss the mechanics of 
capturing the state.
The mechanisms of capturing the state
There are two questions we need to answer: how do the criminals capture 
the state and what do they do when they come to power? To answer this 
question we elaborate on some of the propositions discussed by Markovska 
and Serduyk (2011) previously and Rushenko (2014) most recently. 
 Firstly, political corruption is employed as a tool to impose criminal 
authority. This tool was employed during the poorly inplemented privatisation 
(Cheloukhine, 2008) by buying votes and Parliamentary positions (Rushenko, 
2014). Members of organised criminal groups bought their MPs seats, 
different ministerial positions in the capital, and local regional authority 
(Ibid.).
 Secondly, there was the introduction of social innovations. For 
organised criminals, political corruption works smoothly only when it is 
institutionalised and its proceeds are collected effectively and managed 
collectively. Similarities may be found with an old ‘obshchak’, the common 
cash that used to be collected and kept by the thieves-in-law as cash to be 
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used for some specific projects. Cheloukhine (2008, p.360) described that the 
thieves’ moral code included the:
“organisation of the thieves’ communal fund and dedication to enlarge it. 
. . the thieves’ obshchak does not supervise individual crimes, but governs 
the criminal community based on a functional-territorial principle. The 
obshchak has a designated person in charge of a specific spectrum of 
criminal activity, as well as for a certain territory of operations. These 
persons collect taxes from those individuals and businesses, which are 
under organised crime protection.” 
The revenue of the all-Ukrainian ‘state’ obshchak originates from corruption. 
Proceeds of corruption should be collected and passed from junior to senior, 
depending on the sphere of the activity. In higher education, cash can be 
collected by lecturers as exam payments, than moved up to the higher levels 
to be sent to the relevant Ministry in Kiev. Obedience to authority is again 
key to this process. Those who do not obey will be labelled ‘corrupt’, and be 
subected to the “artificial ‘control wave’” (Nelsen and Levi, 1996), the new ‘clean 
hands’ operation which is another token of Potemkin-village law enforcement.
 Rushenko (2014) argued that a watchmen is needed to overview and 
control the processes. He described the example of Zaporozhje, a small 
industrial city in the East of Ukraine. Rushenko (2014) names a well-known 
figure in the city who created a multi-layered structure of racketeering in 
the city. He was a well-known figure who supported one prominent party 
and controlled the ‘state-organised criminal enterprise’. This individual was 
in charge of the following activities: 
1. Racketeering in the city; 
2. The VAT return that could be done only under the condition of operating 
via the specific company controlled by the watchmen, the charge for 
which was 25% of the total amount. 
3. The use of specially-designated intermediaries in all payments, from 
utility bills to licensing. 
4. Most of the small businesses operating with cash (city transport, local 
markets, parking facilities) were controlled by the watchman. The 
watchman was instrumental in moving businesses from legal into illegal 
spheres, and using dedicated conversion centres to launder criminal funds. 
For Rushenko (2014) the above criminal management is exemplary of the 
parallel taxation mechanisms created in the country over the last few years, 
the system that sustained the old criminal ‘obshchak’ within the public 
administration. 
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 The fourth important point, is how to know what is right and what is 
wrong? The important point here is that the criminal elite is above the law 
(Cheloukhine, 2008; Rushenko, 2014). From one side, one has MPs protected 
by the immunity provisions, and from the other side the criminal justice 
system working under strong political guidance and those who exercise that 
guidance are criminals in political or executive office. Varese (2001) discussed 
the emergence of different protection mechanisms in post-Soviet Russia: 
understanding what is right and who is right is very important here, as 
“criminal protectors offer protection services beyond the limits set by the law, some 
policemen compete directly with criminals and double as racketeers or private protectors 
unconstrained by the law” (p.61). Even within police work it is not necessarily 
very clear to the outsider who is right and who is wrong. There will be written 
and unwritten rules for the enagagement with the criminal underworld, but 
in this Ukrainian example, the criminal underworld has become fused with 
the political elite, making the work of police less questionable for them, as 
they protect authority, albeit a criminal one. It is another question that this 
authority is not accountable and transparent. Given that police institutions 
may be so closely linked to this criminal elite, the elite is free to desing and 
test their own illegal mechanisms of social control. The system has to work 
for the whole country, so how do you enforce it? This is explained in the 
next section.
 The fifth and the last point is how do you make sure the above 
arrangements work for the whole country. Luneev (2004) and later Rushenko 
(2014) argued that the concept of criminal terror is worth considering here. 
Consider the needs of the organised criminal underworld that came to 
dominate the political system in Ukraine. They need to establish absolute 
control over public activities and in addition make sure that the citizens 
behave obediently. What do you do with recalcitrant citizens, those who, for 
example, want to demonstrate against the removal of a children’s playground 
or the cutting of trees? Police should be seen as protecting ordinary citizens, 
and on these occasions, it is important to show police restraint to use force 
in the event of public protest. So with police force withheld, in order to deal 
with civil disobedience, compliant but violent criminal groups are hired by 
the interested criminal bosses. Indeed, the criminal elite has experience in 
employing such violent groups to deal with such public protest or to resolve 
administrative disputes in their own ranks. The providers of criminal terror are 
often criminal politicians themselves who hire violent groups during public 
protests to steer their dynamics in the required direction. Violent groups may 
have the required organisation to beat ordinary protestors and the police 
is allowed to interfere when they are given the right signal to remove the 
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protesting citizens (Ibid.). It resonates with the early 1990s and the use of 
‘sportsmen’ in organised racketeering. According to Rushenko (Ibid.) such 
mechanism of dealing with public protest was developed in Kharkiv in 2006 
(there are a number of youtube clips of such conforntations, where the use of 
these criminal groups can be clearly seen). It was seen as a very effective way 
of settling disputes with political rivalries or guarantee the public order, and 
was transposed to different regions in the country. When criminal politicians 
engage with violent groups they aim to deter competitors and scare ordinary 
citizens by means of illicit force. 
 These five points discussed help to understand how the Ukrainian criminal 
state is formed and the role of corruption in the conduct of criminal elite. 
Nelsen and Levi (1996) argued that corruption and anti-corruption should 
be considered together and not regarded as independent phenomena. Given 
the endemic level of corruption in Ukraine, it is important to understand the 
engagement in corrupt conduct at different levels. 
Opportunity structures for state capture and 
corruption
Sung (2002, p. 141) employs a convergence approach in order to understand 
political corruption and provide “a macro level analysis of the formation of 
opportunity structure for corruption”. Sung argues that corruption as a social 
problem “is ultimately the aggregation of rational choices made by utility-maximising 
participants that in the long run become parameters for subsequent choices in determining 
the nature of norms and obligations in similar situations” (Ibid., p141). Holmes 
(2008) added to this that the concept of utility maximisation can be applied 
to “individual agents, including single corporation, which typically works individually, 
very much in competition with other firms” (p. 389). Discussing the conduct of 
transnational corporations Holmes notes that given the opportunity, good 
guys turn to bad guys, political or ‘criminal muscle’ ‘for help’ in order to be 
good again, but meanwhile have become bad guys themselves.
 The readiness of the bad guys in politics to help, or “the state of readiness 
for political corruption depends less on the psychological or personality characteristics 
of the individual public servant, and more on the socioeconomic environment and 
institutional context in which the state and the market are constructed” (Sung, 2002, 
p. 142). Depending on the context public servants can have a very different 
view on corruption (Ibid.). Sung argues that opportunities for corruption are 
observed and maintained through structural, cultural and institutional forces 
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(Ibid.). “They are structured by the temporal and spatial convergence of three minimal 
contributors: structural incentives, risky governmental policies, and the absence of 
effective institutional guardians to monitor and punish corrupt officials” (Ibid., p.141).
 Analysing the first point, structural incentives, in terms of Ukrainian 
realities, it is interesting to consider the application of cultural particularism 
and the tradition of political unaccountability (Sung also considers third 
element, economic hardship). Sung notes that “the ideal types of particularism 
and unversalism indicate how a society applies morals, and ethics” (p.142). 
Universalist values are the values of transparency and clearly defined rules for 
public office holders (Ibid.). In contrast to this is particularism. Sung argues 
that particularism looks at “relationships and circumstances in a specific situation to 
decide what is appropriate . . . trust is often developed through a sustained exchange 
of favours and obligations, which evolves into a stable patron-client relationship” (ibid. 
p.142). Going back to the mechanics of capturing the state, the reason why 
criminal elite came to dominate the political sphere in the country was partly 
because individual members of the criminal groups were able to negotiate 
their access into the diverse state functions. The decision of what is ‘right’ 
was formed not on the basis of morals and duties of public office holders, but 
as a profit-motivated response that was deemed appropriate in the situation 
of exchange of favours. In public service, this profit motivated response is 
only possible if office holders are not accountable for their actions.
 The second point of analysis is the employment of risky policies: “Motivated 
officials need adequate and effective tools to exact, illegitimately, proceeds from state 
coffers or the citizenry” (Ibid., p. 143). In the case of Ukraine, motivated officials 
were the criminal elite who introduced risky politices by establishing 
the network of collecting, controlling and laundering proceeds from the 
‘obshchak’ parallel taxation discussed by Rushenko (2014). 
 The third point of analysis is the existence of institutional guardians 
(Cohen & Felson, 1979). Amongst them Sung (2002) lists strong civil 
society, free press, political opposition and independent judiciary (p. 146). 
Criminal political elite will not be able to survive openly where there is an 
independent judiciary. In the case of Ukraine, the judicial system only works 
in order to support the elite, and punishes the weak and those who have 
no influential friends (or the wrong one). The very nature of the captured 
state is that it loses the independence of the judiciary and thus the ability to 
enforce the rule of law and the equality of everyone in front of the law. In 
2007 Ukraine’s courts were rated among the top five most corrupt national 
institutions (USAID, 2007). 
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“Those [judges] who are not corrupt, are obliged to leave . . . those 
who act alone, without sharing in the upper echelons get fired, or even 
prosecuted on corruption charges . . . over the past nine months, only 
three our of 20 cases I was working on ended without the payment of 
bribe” (Vasiliev, as quoted in Kupatadze, 2012, p.109).
What is important is the fact that political corruption not only corrupts the 
power structures, but it instils the norms and expectations of corrupt conduct 
in all the areas of life in the society, making the fight against corruption 
really difficult. Lambsdorff (2010) looked at the acceptance of bribery and 
gift-giving in 66 countries and argues that culture matters as “bribes are not 
globally condemned to an equal extent” (p. 18) and it is “those who paid bribes who 
are usually more accepting” (p.18). 
 Heidenheimer (2004) notes that in recent years there is much more consensus 
of the concept of democracy, and much more ambiguity about the concept 
of corruption. To Heidenheimer, the previously-established concept of black-
grey-white corruption has been overturned. “The resultant perceptual dilemma may 
be characterised as a problem of colour-luminous ambiguity” (Ibid., p.100). To define 
corruption on a black-grey-white scale one has to find answer to two problems: i) 
if “the particular type of unethical activity was tolerated . . . or . . . demonised”; ii) the type 
of community and ‘the social grouping’ (bid. p.100). Following Heidenheimer’s 
example of Sicilian communities, in Ukrainian communities the acts that will 
be defined as corruption by Western standards are here “standard procedure deeply 
rooted in more general social relationships and obligations” (Ibid. p.101). For Ukrainians 
the decision (according to Western standards) not to make an unofficial payment 
to the ambulance crew may result in low standard of treatment received. For 
Mr Mykola bribing somebody to avoid military services may be considered as a 
necessity that will save him his life.
 Varese (2000) discussed the issue of pervasive corruption on the examples 
of Italy and Central and Eastern Europe. Varese argued that 
“the interplay between widespread corruption, beliefs and social norms 
produces behaviours that support norms of reciprocity, ‘honesty’ and co-
operation but discourage public spiritedness. Social ostracism is then not 
directed towards those who engage in crime and corrupt exchanges but, 
rather, against those who break the norms. In the case of omertа, for 
instance, those who testify are ostracized by their community” (p.13). 
As the study cited early in this work suggests, the judges who are not 
complying with the rules of corrupt conduct in Ukraine will be dealt with 
by their ‘community’. 
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 Zaloznaya (2012) studied corrupt practices within Ukrainian universities 
to explore the experiences with university bribery and argues that “exposure 
to organizational cultures shapes actor’s ideas regarding acceptability and inevitability 
of bribery and influences their propensity to commit the acts of corruption . . . the 
actors make projections about the necessity, possibility or inevitability of corruption” 
(p.311). 
 Challenging the organisational structures, be it within the high 
deducational establishment or within the Ministry of Defence, is a tricky and 
challenging issue. In a simplified way we have described the system where 
criminal underworld is the state, and corrupt conduct is at the very heart of 
the system. Challenging the culture at the top requires strong political will 
and an independent judiciary, both only exist only on paper or as a front in a 
Potemkin village. It is interesting to see if and how the events of the winter 
2014 in Ukraine challenged ordinary people’s perception about corruption.
Kharkiv residents on corruption: 
the results of 2013 and 2014 monitoring
Serdyuk (2014) conducted two studies to monitor corruption in the city of 
Kharkiv, Eastern Ukraine. The first study was conducted in December 2013 
and the second in October 2014, 673 respondents aged 16 and above were 
interviewed. The timing of the monitoring is of importance for us here. The 
first monitoring conducted during the first wave of peaceful protest in Kiev 
in December 2013, and the second monitoring was conducted at the time of 
the full scale military operation in the East of the country.
 The respondents were asked to comment on the seriousness of the 
problem of corruption for their country. More respondents in 2014 believe 
that corruption is a very serious concern for the country. 
Table 1
“In your opinion, how serious is the problem of corruption in Ukraine?”
Rating 2013 2014
Very serious 44,8 53,2
Rather serious than not 34,6 29,3
Difficult to say 17,3 13,1
On the threshold of seriousness 3,3 2,4
Absolutely not serious 0 1,7
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The increase in the number of people believing that corruption is a serious 
concern for the country is connected to the dramatic events of the 2014.
 Table 2 sheds light on opinions of the level of corruption in the country 
and in the home city. The estimation of the level of corruption in the country 
has risen sharper than in the estimation about the home city.
Table 2
Opinions of the level of corruption in the country and Kharkiv (in % ).
2013 2014
Rating In Ukraine In Kharkiv In Ukraine In Kharkiv
Very high 38,7 31,6 62,8 42,0
Higher than average 39,1 39,5 26,4 31,4
Average 16,0 21,9  9,2 19,3
Below average  2,0  3,9  0,3  2,8
Very low  0,6  0,4  0,3  1,2
Difficult to say  3,7  2,7  0,9  3,2
The estimated level of corruption in Ukraine has increased by 24%, and in 
the city of Kharkiv only by 11%. There are some researchers who argue that 
“concentrated power is an aggravating factor in corruption” (Andvig et al., 2000, p. 
86). In Ukrainian context the rising worry about corruption in general may 
be explained by the anti-corruption slogans of the winter 2014 appraising 
in Kiev which prompted awareness finding its expression in a higher rating.
 The respondents were asked to say whether the level of corruption in the 
city of Kharkiv has changed in the last 12 months. Table 3 shows that 35.6% 
of respondents believe that the level of corruption has increased in 2014.
Table 3
In your opinion has the level of corruption changed 
in the last 12 months? (%)
Rating 2013 2014
Increased dramatically 17,2 17,1
Increased a little bit 26,6 18,5
Hasn’t changed 46,4 46,1
Decreased a little bit 3,9 9,8
Decreased dramatically 0,6 1,2
Difficult to say 5,3 7,3
Total % 100,0 100,0
In order to understand the subjective opinion about corruption the 
respondents were asked to comment if corruption has an effect on welfare of 
the citizens and on their own welfare.
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Table 4
In your opinion, does corruption threaten the welfare of the citizens of 
the country, your own welfare?
2013 2014
Opinion category Welfare  









Yes, it does affect 56,6 39,5 68 55,7
Rather threatens than not 37 41,5 23,9 19
Rather not threatens 3,9 9,9 2,9 12,5
No, it doesn’t threaten 0,6 5,4 1,6 9
Difficult to say 1,9 3,7 3,6 3,9
Table 4 shows that the respondents consider corruption to be a threat. 
The threat of corruption to their own welfare is lower than the threat of 
corruption to the whole country. Only 15,3 % of the respondents thought 
that corruption does not threaten them personally in 2013, this number 
increased to 21,5% in 2014.
 Corruption studies in Serbia make an interesting comparison here. Begović 
and Mijatović (2007) compared the attitude to corruption in Serbia in 2001 and 
in 2006 and note the impact of politicisation on people’s perception of corruption. 
Generally, people think about corruption as a serious problem for the country, 
but not for them personally (Ibid.). Interestingly, this finding resonates with the 
Kharkiv sample. For respondents in the Serbian sample, what was important is the 
issue of poverty, low standards of living, political instability and bad health care 
(Ibid.). One can argue that some of these isseus are the direct result of corruption. 
 In the Kharkiv study, in order to understand the readiness to participate 
in corrupt exchanges the respondents were asked if they believe that bribery 
or unofficial payments and presents can be justified if it is necessary to solve 
their own problem. Only 16,1% of the respondents believe that corruption 
cannot be justified, and 62,9% believe that sometimes corruption can be used 
in order to resolve personal issues. Compared with 2013, the readiness to 
participate in corrupt conduct has increased. This readiness may be explained 
as a defence mechanism. Varese (2000) argues that even those people who 
dislike the corrupt system, but have to live in the country, over time will adapt 
to it in order to reduce ‘cognitive dissonance’: “the psychologically difficulty 
involved in constantly despising one’s own country and oneself” (p.11). Varese quotes 
a respondent in Ukraine who says that “at first you feel uncomfortable [giving 
bribe], then you get used to it. You also feel satisfaction” (p.11). Young Mr Mykola 
may dislike the corrupt system, but for the time being, for him, the ability to 
pay a bribe to avoid military conscription is essential. 
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 The respondents were asked to select four statements out of 8 in order 
to answer question what does corruption mean to society and people. The 
results are presented in Table 5.
Table 5
In your opinion what does corruption mean for people and society? 
(2014 monitoring only)
%
Corruption is like a cancer, destroys any positive developments 50,9
Corruption changes people, teaches not to obey the law, enrich quickly 48,2
Corruption discredit the state and the criminal justice system 45,3
Corruption is a fast way of solving difficult issues with little bureaucratic involvement 36,3
Popular proverb says, “Doesn’t move without the oil” 33,0
Corruption means throwback and obstacle to European integration 26,7
It is an old tradition that may be justified 18,4
Corruption is a stimuli and motivation for many professions and for the management 16,7
About quarter of the respondents answered that corruption prevents the 
development of the country. One in five stated that corruption is an old 
tradition that may be justified. To understand the personal conduct in response to 
corruption the respondents were asked about their personal attitude to bribery.
Table 6
Personal attitude to corruption (2014 in % )
%
As a last resort, in the exceptional situations, when you need the result, bribery is allowed 44,5
Never and under no circumstances bribery should be allowed 24,7
It is possible to avoid bribery, just need to be more philosophical to life 24,2
Bribes are allowed as it is a fast and convenient method of problem solving 4,9
Giving and taking bribes is an important part of the system 1,7
The answers show that a tolerant attitude to corruption is more prevalent 
than an intolerance one. Interestingly, the results of the Global Household 
Survey, as presented by Lambsdorff (2010) suggest that respondents who paid 
bribes in the preceding 12 months report a higher level acceptance of such 
conduct. Lambsdorff (2010) argues that “the impact of whether a bribe was paid 
may not only result from the respondents’ cognitive dissonance” (p.13). Lambsdorff 
(2010) offers two reasons for consideration. First is about the norms. “Norms 
are eroded where they are violated by others. A modified attitude is then sought 
that does not deliver the constant unease that is felt when observing violations” 
(p. 13). The second point is about collective acceptance of bribery. “When 
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collectively bribery is accepted individuals face fewer social constraints when 
paying and taking bribes” (Ibid., p.13). In this situation it is important to 
know what is the best way to tackle corruption once self-serving excuses 
have become a reflection of a shared attitude. 
 Graph 1 represents what the respondents thought of the ways of 
tackling corruption. 38,4% of respondents said that it is impossible to tackle 
corruption. What is interesting in the chart is that corrupt conduct is very 
often blamed on the others or outside circumstances: the powerful elite is 
to be blamed (27,4%) or the legal provisions are weak (27,4%). Only 25,8 
% of respondents stated that citizens themselves should stop participating in 
corrupt conduct and 21,2% suggested education as a preventative measure.
Graph 1. The ways to tackle corruption.
The ways to tackle corruption (% from all respondents) 
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Graph 1 also makes an interesting comparison with Serbia. In 2001 people in 
Serbia saw the causes of corruption as very much the political issue (Begović 
and Mijatović, 2007). The politicisation of corruption is a very difficult 
issue to tackle. It promotes a pessimistic attitude that results in “‘nothing’ can 
tackle corruption’ statements; it excuses the personal use of corruption and stresses the 
functionality and usefulness of corrupt exchange. At the end of the day, it can save 
your life if you don’t want to join the army”.
Graph 2 moves the subject of personal attitude closer to the personal actions, 
and asks about personal experience of corrupt exchange.
Graph 2. Personal encounter of corruption.
It is interesting to observe that the number of respondents who had personal 
encounters with corruption has increased compared to 2013. In 2014, from 
one side there is an increase in the occurrence of anti-corruption slogans 
while the movement to fight corruption dominates the political agenda. 
From another side, the actual occurrence of corruption is on the increase 
if we assume a correlation between attitude, opinion and occurrence. It can 
be explained by political instability and anxiety, the need to grab something 
quick and now, because tomorrow one may not keep the same job. 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that as Ukraine announced compulsory military 
conscription earlier in the 2014, corruption was rife within the agencies 
responsible for the exemption from military duties. Bribes are justified as 
“life-saving” opportunity.
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Corruption as a ‘pet monster’
In 2014 respondents showed an acute awareness of corruption as a social 
problem. Respondents note that the level of corruption remains the same in 
the city of Kharkiv, and say that corruption is hurting the others more than 
themselves. About half state that corruption has a negative impact on society, 
but a third state that corruption is the fastest way of resolving problems. 
Compared with 2013, the number of those who are prepared to justify 
corruption has increased, the number of those who are categorically against 
corruption has decreased. About half of the respondents are prepared to use 
corruption as a tool to achieve results in difficult situations. Respondents 
are not united in the ways how to tackle corruption with more than a third 
believing that tackling corruption is an impossible task. Most of those who 
encountered corruption did not report it to the police. People do not report 
because they do not believe in the system’s ability to deal with these issues. 
This is understandable, given that the criminal state offers little hope for the 
rule of law, police as an institution of social control has discredited itself with 
connections to corrupt politicians and violent organised criminal groups. 
On the other hand, many are willing to bribe if that offers an easy solution 
to their personal problem, like avoiding a traffic fine or getting a license. 
 Van Duyne et al. (2012) studied anti-corruption policies in Serbia and 
reported that 20% of the respondents will pay a bribe given the favourable 
outcome of the corrupt transaction: “Many do and few care”, conclude the 
authors (Ibid.). Van Duyne at al. observe an interesting issue in Serbia, where 
generally people don’t perceive corruption as a serious issue. On a personal 
level, if you need to rebuild your life after the war you worry about the 
issues that concern you, unemployment, health care, and education. Only the 
problem is that political corruption can be an obstacle in the progress with 
the development in all these spheares. 
 The results from the Kharkiv study and other countries, suggest that 
people treat corruption with ambivalence. On the one hand, they believe 
corruption is bad, it has negative consequences for society. In Ukraine, 
corrupt officials sold governmental offices in such numbers that it allowed 
criminal underworld to capture all state functions. On the other hand, 
people are prepared to live with corruption and justify corrupt exchanges. 
Corruption has become a social habit legitimised by the state authority (see 
above, the state authority in itself is corrupt and criminal). Given this ‘dirty 
hands reputation’ many people think corruption is the only acceptable way 
of solving the day-to-day issues. The monitorings in 2013 and 2014 showed 
that on an individual level respondents accept corruption, because it has 
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a function as a problem solver. In order to fight corruption respondents 
propose to accuse and to punish somebody else, the change of personal 
conduct is not a priority. 
 This is a tricky situation for a country that proclaims the war on 
corruption. Traditional hue and cry doesn’t work here, as the cry to stop 
corruption has a peculiar self-interest attached. Corruption is a pet monster, 
when needed is taken out and beaten publicly; in other situation it will be 
fostered and kept under control.
 What is questionable is the ability of Ukraine to adopt the approach 
developed in Singapore, the country where “a uniquely low level of corruption 
has been achieved at some cost to democratic civil rights” (Heidenheimer, 2004). 
Singapore has managed to create the world strictest rules on illegal drugs, but 
at the same time it created the third largest gambling market (BBC, 2013). 
The country with the population 10 times smaller than in Ukraine operates 
within the legal framework. Ukrainian legal framework is not operational 
because the state administration and criminal justice system are dysfunctional. 
The only tool that functions whithin the state is the tool of corruption, and 
corrupt exchange. 
 Revolutions and public protests encourage people to be loud about 
corruption that is harmful to them personally. Revolutions and public protests 
do not deal with corruption that is useful to you. To eliminate situations 
where corruption is a useful tool for an ordinary citizen the state mechanism 
should be dealt with: first, by insuring transperancy in state decision making 
from purchasing medical vaccines for children to porridge for soldiers; and, 
second, by making the rule of law principles work and puting an independent 
judiciary in place even if that will have severe consequences for the personnel. 
Fighting corruption without reforming the system is impossible, it will only 
make corruption cheaper. The state functions and the state services should 
gain their lost functionality; so that corruption will become so expensive it 
will be dysfunctional. Reforms should be visible, have a credible impact and 
inspire confidence among the people. Untill then, we remind the reader of 
the appropriate song: “My dear Ukraine, all in ruin . . . and the only people who 
live are the MPs, the rest are in trenches, and they were there even before the war 
started”.3
3 The words from the song ‘All in ruins’ of the late singer Skryabin.
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